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1. Summary 
Private equity and financial investors 
 Since 2001, private equity (PE) activity has grown rapidly, especially in continental Europe and 
Asia, which now account for 45% and 10% of PE takeovers.  
 Private equity takeovers accounted for 20% of all takeovers in Europe in 2006  
 About 60% of all private equity takeovers are of companies listed on the stock exchange, or 
divisions of companies. On average companies are sold on after 4 years, just over 50% are floated on 
the stock exchange or sold to industrial companies. 
 The rate of bankruptcies amongst firms bought by private equity is at least twice as high as the rate 
amongst stock exchange quoted firms. At least 6% of companies bought by private equity end up 
bankrupt. 
 PE buyouts fell sharply in the last quarter of 2007, because of the financial crisis. 
 Pension funds, insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds all control far more financial  
assets than private equity, but private equity has the most direct impact on ownership and 
employment. 
 Infrastructure funds may be more interested in long-term investment with lower returns, but it is too 
early to know how rapidly they will be sold on. They may create extra pressure for privatisations. 
 The different types of investors may have complex relations, as in the consortia which bought two of 
the largest UK water companies in 2007, whose partners include insurance companies, pension 
funds, SWFs, major banks, and infrastructure funds of major global financial companies (which have 
in turn been recently rescued by SWFs taking a large shareholding). 
 
Sectors 
 There were few new PE buyouts in the water sector in 2007.  The only major buyouts appear to be 
the purchase of two UK water companies, but these were by consortia of financial investors rather 
than a PE group.  
 There were few new PE buyouts in the waste sector in 2007, and some sales. The KKR purchase of 
DSD in Germany has adversely affected employment. In early 2008 PE and financial investors were 
bidding for Biffa in the UK. 
 There was a lot of activity in healthcare and social care in 2007. This included major buyouts of 
hospitals and care homes in the UK, and investments in central Europe and elsewhere. 
 There is a lot of PE investment in renewable electricity generation. 
 In the UK some PFI schemes have been sold on to PE and financial investors.  
 
Issues 
 Parliaments in OECD countries have been very concerned about private equity in 2007. 
These concerns have covered: labour and employment issues; financial sustainability of 
LBOs; tax treatment of PE; and corporate governance. 
 Some PE groups are now listed on stock exchanges but still do not have to disclose financial 
details of the companies they own 
 The proportion of debt used in PE buyouts has increased in recent years and has been recycled by 
banks in the same way as sub-prime mortgages.  
 Some UK water companies have issued long-term index-linked bonds, which implies a great degree 
of confidence in government and regulatory guarantees 
 
Employment 
A new study on the employment impact of PE, commissioned by the World Economic Forum, shows that: 
 workplaces of firms taken over by PE have 10% less employees 5 years after the takeover, than if 
they had developed like similar workplaces not bought by PE 
 firms taken over by PE have about 4% less employees 2 years after the takeover, than if they had 
developed like similar workplaces not bought by PE (even after including the net effect of creating, 
buying, closing and selling new workplaces) 
 firms taken over by PE have much higher rates of  closure, opening, acquisition and disposal of 
workplaces, in the 2 years following a PE takeover, than comparable firms. 
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Table 1.  Terminology and abbreviations 
IPO Initial public offering:  the process of listing a company on the stock exchange. 
LBO Leveraged buyout:  the typical form of PE takeover, buying an existing company using a 
lot of borrowed money  
PE Private equity 
PE groups The private equity institutions themselves e.g. Blackstones, KKR, Apax 
PE-owned companies Companies owned by PE groups e.g.  Thames Water, Capio 
PE funds Specific funds set up by PE groups to buy companies e.g. Maquarie Infrastructure Fund. 
Each PE group has a number of different funds. 
SWF Soveriegn wealth funds: state-owned investment funds 
Trillion Always used to mean 1,000,000, 000,000 (i.e. one thousand billion) 
 
2. Private equity and other financial investors 
2.1. Overview 
 Since 2001, private equity (PE) activity has grown rapidly, especially in continental Europe and 
Asia, which now account for 45% and 10% of PE takeovers.  
 Private equity takeovers accounted for 20% of all takeovers in Europe in 2006  
 About 60% of all private equity takeovers are of companies listed on the stock exchange, or 
divisions of companies. On average companies are sold on after 4 years, just over 50% are floated on 
the stock exchange or sold to industrial companies. 
 The rate of bankruptcies amongst firms bought by private equity is at least twice as high as the rate 
amongst stock exchange quoted firms. At least 6% of companies bought by private equity end up 
bankrupt. 
 PE buyouts fell sharply in the last quarter of 2007, because of the financial crisis. 
 Pension funds, insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds all control far more financial  
assets than private equity, but private equity has the most direct impact on ownership and 
employment. 
 Infrastructure funds may be more interested in long-term investment with lower returns, but it is too 
early to know how rapidly they will be sold on. They may create extra pressure for privatisations. 
 The different types of investors may have complex relations, as can be seen in the consortia which 
bought two of the largest UK water companies in 2007, which were not PE groups but  joint ventures 
stating that they see the companies as long-term stable investments, whose partners include 
insurance companies, pension funds, SWFs, major banks, and infrastructure funds of major global 
financial companies (which have in turn been recently rescued by SWFs taking a large 
shareholding). 
2.2. PE groups: buying and selling 
Data from the WEF and McKinsey studies confirms that since 2001 PE activity has grown rapidly, especially 
in continental Europe and Asia, represents a high proportion of takeovers, covers all sectors, and is most 
likely to result in the company being sold to an industrial company or to another PE company. The rate of 
bankruptcies is at least twice as high as the rate amongst stock exchange quoted firms. PE buyouts fell 
sharply in the last quarter of 2007, because of the financial crisis. 
 
 The total value of  firms (both equity and debt) acquired by PE groups in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) 
is estimated to be $3.6 trillion since 1970, of which $2.7 trillion worth of transactions occurred 
between 2001 and 2007.  Out of the 21,397 leveraged buyout transactions that took place from 1970 
to 2007, more than 40% took place after 1 January 2004.  
 
 In 2006 PE leveraged buyouts accounted for about 20% of all takeovers in Europe, and 30% in the 
USA. The average size of the deals was $304m. in Europe, and $428m. in the USA. The largest 
deals in 2006-7 were in the USA, including an energy company, TXU ($45billion), and a hospital 
company, HCA ($33billion). 1 
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 Since 2001, about 28% of deals have been buyouts of stock exchange companies (public-to-private) , 
31.6% buyouts of divisions of companies (divisional buyouts), and 38.2% buyouts of companies 
which are already private or already owned by financial investors such as other PE firms. 
 
 Since 2001, about 45% of the companies bought in LBOs have been in USA and Canada, about 45% 
in Europe, and 10% in the rest of the world. 
a
  There has been a much greater proportion in 
continental Europe and Asia compared with the period before 2000, when 4/5ths of all buyouts were 
in the USA and UK.  
 
 Target firms are spread across all sectors of the economy. According to WEF data, healthcare, 
infrastructure and utilities and education combined account for 5.2% of all buyouts since 1970.  
 
 But PE buyouts fell sharply at the end of 2007 and it is unlikely they will recover in 2008. The drop 
was striking in the UK: ―Though private equity has transformed the UK economy, employing over 
11 per cent of private sector workers, new deals have dropped off a cliff. The volume of British 
buyouts tumbled 80 per cent in the fourth quarter as the squeeze on global credit led to the quietest 
three months in nearly five years‖.2 
 
Table 2.  LBOs by type and region 
Type 2001-2007   Region 1970-2000 2001-2007 
 % of deals 
by value 
  % of deals by 
value 
% of deals 
by value 
Public-to-private 28.9  USA 64.5 42.8 
Divisional buyout 31.6  Canada 1.5 2.4 
Private-to-private 14.7   0 0 
Financial vendor 23.5  UK 15.0 15.5 
Distressed/bankrupt firms 1.4  Scandinavia 2.3 4.5 
   Eastern Europe 0.2 1.0 
   Rest of Europe 13.2 26.1 
   Africa & middle east 0.3 1.3 
   Asia 1.8 4.0 
   Australia 0.3 1.3 
   Latin America 0.9 1.2 
      
Total value of deals $2679billion   $1242 billion $2679billion 
Source: WEF 2008 Demography  study Table 2a and 2b 
 
 
 On average companies are sold after just over 4 years, but almost 40% are still held as LBOs after 10 
years. The most common form of exit is sale to a company in the same sector (38%); the next most 
common is sale to another PE group (23%). About 14% are floated on the stock exchange.  
 
 About 6% go bankrupt. The rate of bankruptcy of LBOs is twice as high as USA listed companies 
(and the  true figure may be higher as other bankruptcies may be concealed in the 12% of ‗unknown‘ 
exits): ―6% of buyout transactions end in bankruptcy or financial restructuring. Assuming an average 
holding period of six years, this works out to an annual default rate of 1.2% per year. As a 
comparison, the annual default rates for US publicly traded firms in Compustat over the 1983 to 
2002 period was half this number, 0.6%‖.  
 
 Over the whole period of 1970–2002 period, the fraction of firms exiting LBO status by going public 
(IPO) was 11%, which is higher than the 6% of LBOs that originated from public-to-private 
transactions. But in 2006 McKinsey states that there were more LBOs of stock exchange firms than 
                                                     
a The WEF study examined a dataset of  over 21,000 LBOs that took place worldwide between 1970 and 2007.  About 
70% of USA buyouts were included, but a lower percentage of European ones. Given the sample bias towards the USA, 
the true figures for Europe and the rest of the world are probably higher. 
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there were IPOs, so there is now a net reduction in stock exchange firms. PE ownership has thus 
increased relative to stock exchange quoted companies, and McKinsey expect this trend to continue. 
 
 
Table 3.  Exit route of LBOs 1970-2002 
Type of exit No of 
exits 
% of all 
exits 
Months 
to exit 
(median) 
Months 
to exit 
(mean) 
Exited 
within 
1 yr 
Exited 
within 2 
yrs 
Exited 
within 
5 years 
Bankruptcy 488 7      
IPO 966 14      
Financial buyer 1644 23      
LBO corporate buyer 336 5      
Management 115 2      
Strategic buyer 2728 38      
Other 818 12      
Total exited LBOs 7095 100 49 42 2.7% 10.7% 38.7% 
No exit (remain as LBOs) 3752       
Source: WEF 2008 Demography  study Table 4b p. 19, Table 5 p.20 
 
2.3. PE groups size relative to other types of financial investor 
McKinsey (2007) estimate that PE groups control $0.7 trillion (=$700billion), worldwide, in companies 
which they have bought through leveraged buyouts (LBOs).  This excludes venture capital investments. 
PE assets are small in relation to other institutional investors. Mutual funds, pension funds and insurance 
companies each hold assets of about $20tr., and together they control over one-third of world financial 
assets. McKinsey identify three ‗new‘ types of institutional investor, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), hedge 
funds and PE, which between them held $8.4 trillion in 2006,  5% of total world financial assets, and they 
are growing faster than pension funds etc.  
 
 PE is the smallest of the ‗new‘ types, controlling only $0.7trillion, compared with $6.7trillion held 
by SWFs, and $1.5 trillion by hedge funds. It is also the slowest growing, at 14% per annum, not 
much faster than insurance funds (11% p.a.).  The total amount controlled by all PE groups is 
smaller than that controlled by some of the largest individual institutions.  
 
 However PE makes a disproportionate impact, for two reasons.  
 
o Firstly, PE always invests directly in companies, whereas the other institutions invest in 
other assets e.g.  bonds. The impact of PE on corporate ownership is therefore greater. The 
value of firms owned by PE is equal to 5% of the value of stock market companies in the 
USA, and 3% in Europe, according to McKinsey.  
o Secondly, PE funds are highly ‗active‘ investors, usually with 100% ownership of a 
company, and so the PE group policy has a direct effect on the companies and employees. 
Other financial investors are normally content with minority shareholdings and a passive 
relationship with management (though a number of pension funds, especially in the USA,  
have become much more active e.g. Calpers). 
 
 
Table 4.  Value of assets managed by financial institutions, including private equity 
 Value of assets 
managed  $ 
trillion (2006) 
Annual 
growth rate 
200-2006 
% of global 
financial 
assets 
World financial assets 167  100% 
    
I. Types of financial institutions     
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Pension funds 21.6 5 13% 
Mutual funds 19.3 8 12% 
Insurance companies 18.5 11 11% 
     
SWFs 6.7 19-20 4% 
Hedge funds 1.5 20 0.9% 
PE funds 0.7 14 0.4% 
     
II. Individual investment institutions     
     
Barclays Global Investment 1.7  1.0% 
State Street Global Advisers 1.6  1.0% 
Legg Mason Capital Management 1.1  0.7% 
Vanguard 1.1  0.7% 
Allianz Global Investors 1.1  0.7% 
People’s Bank of China 1.1  0.7% 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 0.9  0.5% 
Bank of Japan 0.9  0.5% 
JP Morgan Fleming AM 0.9  0.5% 
Mellon Global Investments 0.8  0.5% 
Source: McKinsey 2007 
Table 5.  Value of companies owned by private equity 2006  ($billions) 
USA Europe Asia Total 
422 182 103 707 
Source:  McKinsey 2007 
 
2.4. Source of funds 
PE is also a ‗secondary‘ investment vehicle, whose funds are financed by other institutions. According to 
McKinsey, over one-third of the finance for PE purchases of existing companies through leveraged buyouts 
(LBOs) comes from pension funds. 23% comes from public sector pension funds alone.  For example, the 
Irish National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF) aims to invest a total of $2 billion in private equity funds.3 
 
Over a third comes from pooling of PE funds. For example, Mid Europa Partners new fund includes 
commitments ―from over sixty leading investors, including AGF Private Equity, Alpinvest, ATP Private 
Equity Partners, AP2, Auda Private Equity, AXA Private Equity, Caisse des Depots et Consignations, CAM 
Private Equity, Citigroup, European Investment Bank (EIB), Feri, Government Investment Corporation of 
Singapore, Goldman Sachs Asset Management, HarbourVest, MetLife, OP Trust, Pantheon, TIAA, and 
Unigestion.‖4 
Table 6.  Sources of funds for Private equity LBO funds (%) 
 % of value of 
PE LBO funds 
Banks 4 
Investment companies 5 
Endowments 6 
Insurance 7 
Pension funds: corporate 10 
Pension funds: public 23 
PE fund of funds 37 
Other 8 
Source: McKinsey 2007 
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2.5. Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) 
The sovereign wealth funds are state-owned investment institutions responsible for investing the financial 
assets of countries. There are two main groups of countries with substantial amounts to invest in this way. 
One is the oil-exporting countries, such as Bahrein, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and also 
Norway, Russia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Indonesia; the other is Asian countries who have accumulated large 
foreign currency reserves as a result of trade surpluses (and IMF policy conditions): China and Japan are the 
biggest of these, but others include Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. 
 
These funds are very large and have become important investors: some of the banks and financial companies 
which experienced problems at the end of 2007 obtained the funds they needed from SWFs: for example the 
Singapore fund Temasek invested just under GBP£1billion in Barclays bank, equivalent to 2.1% of the share 
capital.  The USA and large EU countries have been concerned about SWFs because they are state-owned, 
and so they are concerned that the funds might be used for political objectives. There is however no evidence 
of this. 5 
 
There is another group of state-owned funds, which are used to support pension schemes in a number of 
countries, for example Norway and Sweden. The trade union advisory committee (TUAC) at the OECD has 
identified these pension reserve funds (PRFs) as potential sources of good practice: 
 
―PRFs such as the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, the French Fonds de réserve des 
retraites, and the Swedish AP Funds have all active socially responsible investment policies which 
cover part or the totality of their investment mandates. Scandinavian PRFs in particular have 
engagement policies with the management of invested companies with regards to compliance with 
ILO core labour standards and international human rights. Some Swedish AP funds apply negative 
screening: For example in 2006 AP2 excluded Wal Mart of its portfolio for discrimination against 
women in Guatemala and anti-union action and labour legislation violations in the United States. 
AP1 had ―targeted ethical engagement‖ with that company as well as with BHP Billiton (Anti-union 
action in Australia), Chevron Texaco (Human rights violations in Nigeria), L-3 Com (Human rights 
violations in Iraq), Marathon Oil (Corruption in Equatorial Guinea), Total (Human rights violations 
in Burma), Thales (Corruption in South Africa), Toyota (Anti-union action in the Philippines) and 
Yahoo! (Actions curbing freedom of expression in China).‖ 6 
 
The OECD identifies 11 major SWFs,  but it does not include reserve banks. As a result they do not  include 
any of the three major funds noted by McKinseys, and the scale of the assets involved are much smaller. 
Table 7.  Major Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) identified by OECD 
 Assets (US$billion ) 
2006 
 
   
United Arab 
Emirates 
688  
Norway* 316  
Singapore 215  
Kuwait 174  
Russia 122  
Singapore 108  
China 66  
Qatar 50  
Algeria 43  
United States 40  
Kuwait 39  
 Source: OECD 2007 
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2.6. Infrastructure funds: potential problems 
Infrastructure funds have been created by a number of financial institutions. For example, Credit Suisse and 
GE have set up a joint fund called Global Infrastructure Partners, which at the start of 2008 was likely to buy 
the UK waste management company Biffa. As discussed in the 2006 report 7, these may reflect a different 
investment model of long-term secure returns rather than rapid capital gains. If so, then there may be less of 
a threat to job security. In addition, the higher level of debt finance may be closer to a public sector form of 
financing.   
 
But infrastructure funds may create different and additional problems.  
 
 Infrastructure funds may be a source of new pressure for privatisation., as this creates more assets 
that the funds can buy, such as water, roads, ports, airports, . According to the FT report of a 
conference on infrastructure funds in October 2007: ―Speaker after speaker urged delegates to press 
the case for privatisation round the world.‖8   But in developing countries infrastructure is less 
established and more risky so the infrastructure funds are then acting more like other PE investors, as 
noted in the FT: ―If you build an airport in a developing country, you are taking on construction risk, 
operating risk, political and regulatory risk and so on. That calls for correspondingly higher returns. 
In fact, you have joined the world of private equity.‖ 9  
 
 If infrastructure funds are run by PE groups then their usual high fees may create extra 
unsupportable demands. As noted in the FT: ―If you are settling for a low return, of course, you 
cannot afford private equity fees. One speaker claimed some funds charged private-equity type fees 
for running wind farms. On what grounds, he asked? Could they make the wind blow?‖ 10 
 Some infrastructure investments have been re-financed through long-term index-linked bonds (see 
below) which indicates that they expect long-term stable returns. But it is too early to know if these 
investors will in practice act as long-term owners with less short-term pressures on assets and 
workers. For example, the  McKinsey 2007 report claims that infrastructure  funds expect to hold 
their investments for  10 yrs with 14% annual return, compared with other LBOs who expect to hold 
assets for 4-5yrs with annual returns of 18%. They offer no evidence for this assertion and there can 
be none: infrastructure funds have only existed for 3 or 4 years so far.  
2.7. The mixed new financial owners of English water companies 
The complex relations between the different types of investors can be seen in the consortia which bought two 
of the largest UK water and sewerage companies during 2007.   
 These consortia are not PE groups running funds and charging fees to investors.  
 They are however private companies which have taken the companies off the stock market.  
 They are joint ventures owned by a few financial institutions each with a large but minority 
shareholding. They state that they see the companies as long-term stable investments  
 The partners include insurance companies, pension funds, SWFs, major banks, and infrastructure 
funds of major global financial companies (which have in turn been recently rescued by SWFs 
taking a large shareholding) 
 
Southern Water  was bought by a consortium called Greensands Investment. The owners of Greensand are: 
 JP Morgan Infrastructure Investments Group (32%). Created in 2006 this also has investments in gas 
and water company in the USA and a wind-farm company in the UK.. The JP Morgan Chase group 
claims to hold assets worth $1.6 trillion. 
 Challenger Infrastructure Fund (27%). This fund is run by an Australian financial services company. 
It also has stakes in UK gas networks in Wales and the northwest of England. 
 UBS (18%), a major Swiss bank with assets of about $2.75 trillion. It made large losses in 2007 and 
has been rescued by an injection from Government of Singapore Investment Corp. of CHF 13bn. 
(US$ 10bn). 
 seven Australasian superannuation funds advised by Access Capital Advisers (18%),  
 the ex-BT pension fund Hermes (4%), and  
 Paceweald Limited, advised by Consensus Business Group (1%).  
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 Since the takeover, Cheung Kong Infrastructure (CKI), a private Hong Kong group which also owns 
Cambridge Water, announced it was buying 4.88% of Greensands. 
 
Kelda Group, which includes Yorkshire Water, was bought by a consortium called Saltaire Water. This is a 
joint venture between four financial institutions which involve banks, insurance companies, and sovereign 
wealth funds. The four institutions are: 
 Citi Infrastructure Investors: Citi is one of the largest USA-based financial companies, formed from 
merchant banks including Citibank, Schroders, Salomon Brothers and others. At the end of 2007 the 
financial crisis forced Citi to raise new capital, and it sold $7.5 billion worth of shares to a sovereign 
wealth fund, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority.11  The takeover of Kelda group appears to be the 
first significant investment by Citi Infrastructure Investors. 12 
 GIC Special Investments Pte Ltd: GIC was set up in 1981 to manage Singapore‘s foreign currency 
reserves: it is the sovereign wealth fund of Singapore, wholly owned by the government of 
Singapore. It now manages over $100billion worth of investments. GIC Special Investments is the 
private equity and infrastructure division, which says it is Asia‘s largest PE investor, with over 2000 
companies worldwide in a range of sectors. 13 It started in the 1980s providing capital to USA 
venture capital and private equity funds, and then became a major investor in AIG Asian 
Infrastructure Funds, set up by the USA insurance company American International Group. The first 
of these, Asia I, set up in 1994, has funds of $1.08billion, and has 24 investments in a wide variety of 
sectors including fixed line and mobile telecommunications, toll roads, container terminals 
and electric power and water, and in countries including China, India, Korea, the Philippines, 
Taiwan and Thailand. The second, Asia II, set up in 1998, made 18 investments totalling US$990 
million in industries ranging from fixed and mobile telephony, petrochemicals, transportation, 
cement, agribusiness, paper manufacturing, and technology. 
 Infracapital Partners LP: is the infrastructure fund of the Prudential Group, one of the largest UK 
insurance companies. It was established to make investments in infrastructure assets, including 
electricity, gas, water and ports. 
 HSBC is the largest UK bank. 
 
3. Sectoral activity 
3.1. Overview 
 There were few new PE buyouts in the water sector in 2007.  The only major buyouts appear to be 
the purchase of two UK water companies, but these were by consortia of financial investors rather 
than a PE group.  
 There were few new PE buyouts in the waste sector in 2007, and some sales. The KKR purchase of 
DSD in Germany has adversely affected employment in the waste sector. In early 2008 PE and 
financial investors were bidding for Biffa in the UK. 
 There was a lot of activity in healthcare and social care in 2007. This included major buyouts of 
hospitals and care homes in the UK, and investments in central Europe and elsewhere. 
 There is a lot of PE investment in renewable electricity generation. 
 In the UK some PFI schemes have been sold on to PE and financial investors.  
 
3.2. Water 
 
Outside the UK there do not appear to have been any new private equity takeovers of European water 
companies. As reported previously, in 2006 there were net exits by private equity groups, with PAI selling 
SAUR to a consortium including the French state fund CDC, and Penta, the Czech PE group, sold its water 
company in Czech republic to the Spanish multinational FCC.  
 
In the UK, there has been continued activity by PE groups. The takeovers of Kelda Group and Southern 
Water have removed two more UK water companies from the stock market. These are two of the large water 
and sewerage companies, like Thames Water, (not the smaller water-only companies which have been the 
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main subject of PE takeovers in the past). In both cases the new owners are private companies, but consortia 
of financial institutional investors rather than funds run by PE groups. 
 
The Bahrein SWF Arcapita sold South Staffs Water to a New York based infrastructure fund, Alinda. South-
East water, also owned by financial investors, bought Mid Kent Water.  
 
The net effect is to increase the concentration of ownership and the dominance of financial institutions 
owning companies. Only 5 UK water companies remain on the stock market, and financial institutions own 
30% or more of three of these  (Northumbrian, Pennon, and Dee Valley). 
 
Table 8.  Ownership of UK water companies February 2008 
Company Owner Country Type of 
owner 
Comments 
Anglian Water Osprey/AWG UK PE/Infra Consortium of 3 funds, inc. 3i 
Northumbrian Water  UK SEC/Fin 25% owned by Ontario Teachers Pensions, 15% 
by fund managers Amvescap, 5% by Barclays 
Bank 
North West Water United Utilities UK SEC  
Severn Trent Water Severn Trent UK SEC  
Southern Water Royal Bank of Scotland UK PE/Infra Bought in October 2007 by Greensands 
Investment Ltd, comprising:6 institutions led by 
JPMorgan 
South West Water Pennon Group UK SEC/Fin Pennon is 30% owned by 5 financial investors 
Thames Water Macquarie Australia PE/Infra  
Welsh Water Glas Cymru UK NPC  
Wessex Water YTL Malaysia M  
Yorkshire Water Kelda UK PE/Infra Two PE investors buy 7% stakes in April 2007 
     
Bournemouth and West 
Hampshire Water 
Biwater UK P Private company, operates internationally, but 
not in EU outside UK. 
Bristol Water Agbar/Suez ES/FR M  
Cambridge Water Cheung Kong 
Infrastructure 
Hong 
Kong 
M  
Cholderton Water Cholderton Estate UK P Private family owned 
Dee Valley - UK SEC 35% of shares owned by Axa SA. 
Folkestone and Dover  Veolia FR M  
Portsmouth Water South Downs Capital UK PE/Infra South Downs Capital  is 36% owned by 
SMIF/Land Securities (PE). SMIF=Secondary 
Market Infrastructure Fund. SMIF itself was 
bought by Star Fund (PE) in 2003, sold in 2006 
to Land Securities (PE) 
South East Water UTA and HDF Australia PE Utilities Trust of Australia (UTA); Hastings 
Diversified Utilities Fund (HDF).  
South Staffordshire 
Water 
Alinda Infrastructure USA PE Bought by Alinda in 2007from Arcapita 
(Bahrein) 
Sutton & East Surrey 
Water 
Aqueduct Capital DE PE Aqueduct Capital is part of Deutsche Bank. 
Bought holding company  East Surrey Holdings 
Group (ESH) for £189m in 2006  from Kellen 
Acquisitions Ltd – part of Terra Firma. Kellen 
had bought ESH only in October 2005, and then 
sold off gas companies. 
Tendring Hundred Veolia FR M  
Three Valleys Veolia FR M  
 
3.3. Waste 
Following a series of disposals in 2006 and 2007 (see paper on waste management EWCs for details)14 the 
private equity presence in major European waste management companies is now as shown in the following 
table. Sulo was sold to Veolia during 2007, and so no longer appears in the table.   
 
In Germany, KKR‘s ownership of DSD has hit employment in the recycling sector because of prices being 
driven down by competitive tendering.  Otherwise the sector continues to be dominated by the industrial 
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groups: Veolia/Onyx, Sita, Rehthmann/Remondis, and Alba.  Alba for example continues to expand, and 
acquired a controlling stake of over 50% in Interseroh, following its acquisition of U-plus earlier in the 
year.15  
Table 9.  Major European waste companies owned by PE/financial investors January 2008 
Date Company Country Empl
oyees 
Owner Notes 
April 2007 Christota AD, 
Wolf 96 OOD 
and Ditz AD  
Bulgaria 800 Equest Investment 
Balkans PE 
Three companies hold waste 
concessions for Sofia. Equest 
specialises in investing in 
Balkan countries. 
May 2007 SAUR France 2500 CDC/Séché/Axa Bought from PAI in May 2007.  
2007 DSD Germany  KKR  
February 
2007 
AVR/Van 
Gansewinkel 
Netherlands 4000 KKR + CVC PE Bought separately by KKR and 
merged in 2007.  
March 2007 Cory 
Environmental 
UK 1000 Financial 
consortium led by 
ABN AMRO  
Bought from Montagu PE in 
March 2007 
2008 Kelda UK  Consortium of 
financial investors 
led by JP Morgan 
 
2008 Biffa UK  ?Montagu/GIP bid 
accepted  
 
3.4. Healthcare16 
PE groups are extremely active in health and social care sectors. Much activity is taking place in the Nordic 
countries, the UK, and central Europe, but the main groups also own companies in Italy, Spain and Portugal, 
and an increasing proportion of the companies in the table operate in European countries outside their own 
home base. Cinven, for example, with major hospital holdings in the UK, also owns private hospital groups 
in France and Spain.
17
 The most active groups are Cinven, 3i, Apax, EQT, Bridgepoint, and Mid Europa. but 
bought Diaverum, formerly Gambro healthcare.  
 
There are some signs of financial investors other than PE groups: Investor, for example, classifies Gambro 
and Mölnlycke Healthcare as ‗operating investments‘, distinct from its private equity investments. 18  
However the PE model of selling companies after 2-5 years for capital gains remains dominant. During 2007 
Bridgepoint, for example, sold both Medica France and Attendo, which they had bought in 2005 and 2003 
respectively; but also made a major new investment by buying Diaverum, formerly Gambro healthcare. A 
new PE group specialising in healthcare, Baigo Capital, set up by German investors, said it expected growth 
from higher spending on healthcare and liberalisation, and profits from selling companies after 5 years: ―Mr 
Bracklo said that his focus would be on taking stakes and boardroom seats to support established healthcare 
companies with a validated business model to expand internationally, strengthen their management and make 
acquisitions. Exits would typically be after five years. He forecast that, within a few years, deregulation in 
countries including France and Germany would provide greater scope for investments in pharmacy chains 
and laboratory diagnostics, while overall healthcare spending would double from current levels to about 20 
per cent of gross domestic product across Europe by 2035.‖19 
 
The UK health and social care sector has seen considerable activity by PE groups and other financial 
investors.  
 
 The largest private hospital group, General Healthcare Group (GHG), is owned by a joint venture of 
PE group Apax and South African healthcare company Netcare. GHG owns BMI Healthcare, and 
also bought hospitals from Nuffield. 20 
 Cinven formed Spire Healthcare from 26 hospitals acquired from the leading non-profit hospital 
company BUPA, and has since then bought Classic Hospitals.21 BUPA has exited from the Uk 
hospital but is actively expanding in Australia and New Zealand.22 
 In the nursing home sector, Blackstone sold the Southern Cross health care group (UK) which it had 
bought in 2004 by floating it on the stock exchange in 2006. It made a return over 4 times its original 
investment.23 Four Seasons is owned by the Qatari SWF Three Delta, and grew by acquiring Care 
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Principles. A smaller firm, positive Lidfestyles, was bought by PE group Sovereign Capital.24 Private 
firms have been helped by a legal ruling that private sector firms have the right to evict residents, as 
the Human Rights Act only applies to publicly owned homes.25 
 
3.4.1. Private care homes exempt from European Convention on Human Rights  
Over 300,000 elderly people in the UK are in privately run residential care homes. Nine out of 10 care homes 
in England and Wales are now run by private firms. The largest private company, Southern Cross, has 
29,000 care home beds in the UK, 80 per cent of which are paid for by local authorities. Southern Cross is 
listed on the stock market, but was owned by Blackstone, a private equity group, from 2004 to 2006.  
 
In 2007 the highest court in the UK ruled that private care homes are not subject to the European Convention 
on Human Rights, because that convention only applies to public authorities. 26 As a result, old people in care 
homes cannot rely on the convention to protect them from eviction. The court ruling followed precedents of 
the European Court and so similar decisions may be made in other  European countries.  
 
The case was brought by an 84-year-old woman suffering from Alzheimer's. She was threatened with 
eviction by a care home owned and run by Southern Cross. She argued that since her place was paid for by 
her local authority, the private home was exercising a "public function'' and was bound by the Human Rights 
Act.  
 
But a corporation is only covered by the European Convention on Human Rights if it is a "public authority", 
defined as a body with some public functions. And the judges ruled, by a 3-2 majority, that Southern Cross 
was not. In the words of Lord Scott, one of the judges: 
 
―Southern Cross is a company carrying on a socially useful business for profit. It is neither a charity nor a 
philanthropist. It enters into private law contracts with the residents in its care homes and with the local 
authorities with whom it does business. It receives no public funding, enjoys no special statutory powers, and 
is at liberty to accept or reject residents as it chooses … and to charge whatever fees in its commercial 
judgment it thinks suitable. It is operating in a commercial market with commercial competitors…….If an 
outside private contractor is engaged on ordinary commercial terms to provide the cleaning services, or the 
catering and cooking services, or any other essential services at a local authority owned care home, it seems 
to me absurd to suggest that the private contractor, in earning its commercial fee for its business services, is 
publicly funded or is carrying on a function of a public   nature. It is simply carrying on its private business 
with a customer who happens to be a public authority. The owner of a private care home taking local 
authority funded residents is in no different position. It is simply providing a service or services for which it 
charges a commercial fee.‖ 
 
This decision contradicted the assurance given by government ministers when the act was passed in 1998, 
that the legal definition of a public authority ―took account of the fact that over the past 20 years an 
increasingly large number of private bodies. . . have come to exercise public functions that were previously 
exercised by public authorities‖. 27 
 
 
PE groups are active in healthcare in central Europe and Turkey 
 
 In October 2007 Mid Europa acquired 100% of LUX-MED, and Medycyna Rodzinna, respectively 
the second and the sixth largest private healthcare providers in Poland. 28 
 
 Penta, a Czech PE group, plans to develop ―health care facilities, pharmacies and betting agencies‖.29 
In Slovakia it owns Procare, a company which started developing a chain of clinics in 2007, as well 
as an insurance company. 30 However, in September 2007 Slovakia reversed its plans to corporatise 
hospitals as plcs. This was supported by unions and criticised by business representatives. 31 
 
 A 30% stake in a Romanian cleaning services company, Romprest Service, was acquired by 3i. 32 
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 Financial investors including PE and sovereign wealth funds from the Gulf states are interested in 
the health sector in turkey. A finance company in Turkey claimed that the private sector could grow 
because of poor performance of the public sector: "The real competition should be not among private 
hospitals but against the public sector. Clumsiness of the public sector is a great opportunity for 
foreign creditors since the rival is very weak."33 
 
Table 10.  Private equity and healthcare, January 2008 
Company  Sector Owner Type Bough
t 
Previous status  
Aleris NO Social 
care 
EQT PE 2005 Division of ISS  
Alliance Medical  
 
UK Health 
care 
Dubai HIC Fin 2007 PE Bridgepoint 
(from 2000, 
previously 3i) 
Subsidiaries include 
Interim Solutions, Alliance 
Diagnostic 
Aramark US Support 
services 
GS Capital, CCMP 
Capital, JP Morgan, 
Thomas H lee partners, 
Warburg Pincus 
PE/fin 2007 Listed  
Attendo SE Social 
care 
Industri Kapital PE 2007 PE (Bridgepoint, 
from 2005) 
 
Capio SE Health 
care 
Apax/Nordic Capital PE 2006 Listed (started 
as VC) 
Sold UK hospitals 2007 . 
Bought Unilabs 2007 
Carema SE Health 
care 
3i/GIC PE/fin    
Clinica Baviera ES Health 
Care 
3i PE 2005  ophthalmology clinics 
Clinical 
Assessment 
Services (CAS) 
UK  Health 
Care 
Bridgepoint  PE 2005   
Diaverum  SE Health 
care 
Bridgepoint PE 2007 PE (EQT) Formerly Gambro 
Healthcare. 155 clinics in 
15 countries 
Four Seasons UK Social 
care 
Three Delta PE/Fin 2006  Bought Care Principles  
(from 3i) 
Gambro SE Renal 
care 
Investor Fin 2006   
General Healthcare 
Group(GHG) 
UK Health 
Care 
Apax/Netcare PE/list
ed 
2006  Joint with Netcare 50.1% 
(South Africa). Owns BMI 
Healthcare, Nuffield 
ISS DK Support 
services 
EQT/Goldmann Sachs PE/fin 2005 Listed  
Lux-Med PL Health 
Care 
Mid Europa PE 2007   
Medica France FR Social 
care 
BC Partners PE 2006 PE (Bridgepoint, 
from 2003) 
Subsids include Aetas 
(Italy) 
Medicover SE Health 
care/insu
rance 
Celex Privat
e 
2006 Listed 
(originally 1996 
VC (Oresa)) 
 
Medycyna 
Rodzinna 
PL Health 
Care 
Mid Europa PE 2007 PE (Enterprise 
investors, from 
2000) 
 
Mölnlycke  SE Health 
Care 
Investor/Morgan 
Stanley 
Fin 2007 PE (Apax, since 
2005) 
 
Partnerships in 
Care 
UK Mental 
health  
Cinven 
 
PE 2005 Division of 
GHG 
 
Positive Lifestyles UK Social 
care 
Sovereign Capital PE 2007 private  
Romprest Service RO Support 
services 
3i PE 2007 private Minority 30% 
Spire Healthcare UK Health 
Care 
Cinven PE 2007 Not for profit 
(BUPA) 
Bought Classic Hospitals 
(from PE group LGV 
Capital) 
Tunstall UK  Health 
Care 
Bridgepoint  PE 2005  Minority stake 
Ultralase UK Health 
Care 
3i PE 2008 Division of 
Corporacion 
laser eye treatment 
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Dermoestetica 
USP Hospitales 
Group 
ES Health 
care 
Cinven PE 2007 PE (Mercapital) Has 25% of HPP (Portugal, 
hospitals) 
Vedici FR Health 
Care 
Apax (minority 
holding) 
PE 2006 Private Six private hospitals, 
employing 800 people 
 
3.5. Other 
3.5.1. Energy 
Private equity funds are investing in energy companies of various kinds across the EU. This is not a 
comprehensive survey, but examples include: 
 
 The German company SAG has been sold to its second private equity owner in 2 years. SAG 
provides build and maintenance outsourcing services to utility transmission and distribution grids 
and employs 5,900 staff. It was sold by RWE in May 2006 to PE group Advent International, a large 
global PE group.  Advent ‗streamlined‘ the business and in December 2007 sold it to EQT, a 
Swedish PE group. 
 
 Austrian PE firm Meinl International Power is investing in solar, wind and conventional energy 
across Europe. It already owns operations in Germany and Spain and is planning further investments 
in Serbia, Slovakia and Bosnia. It states it ―will act as long-term investor to benefit from stable 
cash flows‖. 34 The firm is part of the long-established Meinl food and retail group. 
 
 Bulgarian private equity fund Advance Equity Holding, owned by local financial firm Karoll, plans 
to invest €18.6 m. by the end of 2008 in wind and solar parks. It is the first Bulgarian-owned private 
equity fund. It has stakes in seven companies, including energy efficiency company Energy Effect 
and gas supplier Enesy.35 
 Lithuania is planning to create a joint venture company to take over the electricity companies, 
including Ingalina nuclear power station. The new company will be 62% state-owned and 38% 
owned by a Lithuanian private equity company NDX Energija. It is planned to build a new nuclear 
power station to replace Ingalina: 66% of this will be owned by Poland, Latvia and Estonia, with the 
other 34% owned by the Lithuanian state/PE joint venture.36 
 Romanian gas distributor Gaz Sud was bought by PPF Investments in  Dec 2007  through it's Cyprus 
based SPV Ligatne. 37 
 Czech PE group Penta owns 100% of the Slovak gas turbine cogeneration plant, Paroplynovy Cyklus 
Bratislava, PPC.38 
 Austrian CE Energy Holding AG develops, finances, builds and operates wind parks in Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Brazil. It has started forming a $2 
billion global equity fund in November 2007. It has a joint venture with EnerCap Power Fund, a 
Czech private equity fund focused on renewable energy, whose main investors include the European 
Investment Bank, the EBRD, Invest Credit Austria of the Volksbank Group, and Ireland's Jaguar 
Capital.39  "EnerCap is targeting a minimum gross internal rate of return of 25% on its investments, 
which will typically be exited within three to five years," the company said.40 
 Italy's Apri Sviluppo Private Equity plans to launch a fund with a target size of 100 million euro 
($148 million) focusing on energy projects in south-eastern Europe in the second part of 2008. It will 
start in Bulgaria and also focus on Albania, Romania, Kosovo, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Serbia, 
Montenegro and Slovenia. 
 Swedish PE fund East Capital has created a fund especially to take advantage of possible 
investments in electrical utilities and other sectors in Russia and other former soviet union 
countries..41 
 
3.5.2. UK: PFI, schools 
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Some PFI schemes in the UK have been sold on to financial or PE investors. For example, in November 
2007 the construction group McAlpine  agreed to sell its interests in six PFI concessions to Infrastructure 
Investors Limited Partnership, which is backed by Barclays Private Equity, Societe Generale and 3i. 
McAlpine retains one PFI concession, for the A13 road.42   
 
3.5.3. Estonia: failed railway investment 
Estonia privatised its railways in 2001 to a consortium led by PE company Mid Europa. The 
government was so unhappy with the result that it renationalised the railways in 2007.  
4. Issues 
4.1. General parliamentary concern 
The trade union advisory committee (TUAC) at the OECD states that there has been ―a high degree of 
parliamentary activism across [countries belonging to] the OECD in the past six months‖.  These 
discussions have covered: labour and employment issues; financial sustainability of LBOs; tax 
treatment of PE; and corporate governance. 
43
 
4.2. PE groups listed on stock exchanges 
Although PE groups are largely private firms or partnerships, McKinsey states that there are over 300 PE 
groups listed on stock exchanges, worldwide,  with a total market value of about  $100bn. Major examples 
include the USA group Blackstone and the UK group 3i. KKR also planned to list but deferred it due to 
market conditions.  
 Listed PE groups have to disclose more information about their own finances and activity, in line 
with other stock exchange companies.  
 However, this does not require them to publish the same information about companies they own.  
The companies wholly owned by Blackstone, e.g. Sithe Power, do not publish any more detailed 
information than those owned by other PE groups. 
4.3. Returns to investors in PE funds  
It is now more widely recognised that PE funds have produced mixed returns. If the fees of the PE funds are 
excluded then the returns to investors such as pension funds may be no better, or even worse, than investing 
in the stock market. 44 
 
Low interest rates have boosted the profitability of PE because interest payments absorb less of the operating 
profit. Corporate profits in general have been high and growing.  The combination of these two factors 
means that LBOs with higher gearing have produced higher rates of return to shareholders‘ equity. 
According to a 2005 study by McKinseys, this effect explained 1/3 of the performance of PE funds.  
4.4. Debt 
The general effect of PE buyouts has been to increase the proportion of debt in relation to shareholders‘ 
equity. Whereas stock exchange companies in the USA have about four times as much equity as debt, PE-
owned companies have twice as much debt as equity. 
 
According to McKinsey‘s, the proportion of debt used in PE buyouts has risen sharply since  2002, and 
especially fast in Europe. In 2006, the average PE leveraged buyout in Europe used 6.2 times as much debt 
as equity.  
Table 11.  Use of debt in PE leveraged buyouts: debt to equity leverage ratio 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 USA 4.18 4.08 4.02 4.63 4.85 5.25 4.99 
 Europe 4.44 4.35 4.38 4.49 4.76 5.51 6.20 
Source: McKinseys Exhibit 5.18 
 
PSIRU University of Greenwich                                                                                                                        www.psiru.org 
09/07/2010  Page 17 of 26  
  
The great majority of this debt now comes from bank loans rather than from ‗junk‘ bonds issued by the 
companies. But the banks have repackaged these loans and sold on as ‗collaterised‘ loans (in much the same 
way as the sub-prime mortgage loans were repackaged).45   
 
If interest rates rise in future, this may create greater pressure on PE-owned companies and could lead to 
companies being unable to pay their debts, possibly leading to bankruptcies, closures and further shocks to 
the banking system.  
 
This may be less of a problem with PE-owned companies in public service areas like water, healthcare and 
even waste, as governments and regulators are likely to guarantee to increase payments in line with inflation 
(including rises in interest rates) in order to maintain services. 
4.5. Index-linked bonds 
Some English water companies, including some owned by PE funds, have issued long-term index-linked 
bonds to finance their business.  These bonds provide a return of the rate of inflation plus a small percentage. 
This is remarkable for two reasons. Firstly, it has traditionally been governments which issue such bonds, 
because companies are not normally prepared to take the risk of the level of inflation. Secondly, these are 
very long-term bonds, which investors will only buy if they are convinced of the long-term security of the 
business and its revenues.  
 
The most dramatic example is the case of Thames Water. In 2007 it issued £900 million in index-linked 
bonds with maturities between 35 and 55 years. The money will be used to refinance part of the debt used by 
Maquarie in buying Thames Water.  It is part of a larger £10billion total refinancing of Thames Water. These 
bonds are ―irrevocably and unconditionally guaranteed by Thames Water Utilities Limited ('TWUL'), 
Thames Water Utilities Holdings Limited and Thames Water Utilities Finance Limited.‖46  Other water 
companies that have issued such bonds include Wessex, United Utilities, Kelda, Pennon, Northumbrian, and 
Welsh Water.  
 
An article by Bank of England staff at the end of 2006 discussed the role of index-linked bonds.
47
  By 2006, 
the UK government had issued £120billion of index-linked bonds, and the private sector had issued 
£18billion. 72% of all index-linked bonds issued by the UK government  are held by pension funds and 
insurance companies, because they match their liabilities, which also rise with inflation. Their demand for 
such bonds has risen in recent years, but index-linked bonds still represent less than 10% of pension fund 
assets. The real interest rates associated with index-linked bonds are very low. 50-year government index-
linked bonds have a yield of around 1% in real terms – in January 2006 the yields fell as low as 0.5%. 
 
The supply of government index-linked bonds has risen from under £4billion in 2000 to over £14billion in 
2006, of which more than three-quarters was in bonds maturing in less than 30 years. Companies issued 
relatively few index-linked corporate bonds before 2006. In that year over £5billion were issued, nearly all of 
which were for longer than 30 years. The Bank of England article suggests a number of factors may explain 
this growth, including the wish to lock in the current low levels of interest rates.  
 
Over 90% of these corporate bonds come from two sources: utilities, and PFI schemes.   
―Regulated utilities — these are companies with cash flows that are partly subject to government 
regulation, including privatised utilities such as water, electricity and gas firms. Typically their 
pricing structure will be set by the regulator, with some prices allowed to rise each year by inflation 
(plus or minus a certain percentage). That gives rise to a flow of revenues linked to some degree to 
inflation. 
 
Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) — under these public finance schemes, a private company pays for 
and runs a public infrastructure project (for example, building and maintaining a school or hospital) 
for a number of years. In return, the government pays the company an income stream, often 
inflation-linked.‖ 48 
 
Both of these share the characteristics of a privatised public service with an income stream which is linked to 
inflation and supported by some form of government guarantee.  (The other, minor, issuers of corporate 
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index-linked bonds are the European Investment Bank, itself a public sector body; and some retail stores, 
whose revenues can also be seen as partly linked to inflation). 
 
Chart A.  Utilities and PFI schemes issuing corporate index-linked bonds 
 
 
 
Source: Bank of England 2006 
 
As a company strategy, it can be seen as a way of further increasing the return to equity shareholders. It takes 
advantage of implicit government guarantees to reduce the cost of debt still further; it increases the 
proportion of debt, at a time when interest rates remain low; and it refinances the company at rates well 
below the rate of return on capital allowed to the water companies, so that the remaining profit can support a 
higher dividend to shareholders. Although the bonds are long-term, they can nevertheless be seen as helping 
a strategy of short-term returns, because the effective interest rates are much lower. So it remains uncertain 
whether such moves support the idea that  infrastructure funds are more long-term, stable owners accepting a 
lower rate of return.  
 
Index-linked debt is also being used to finance or refinance other infrastructure run by concessions or PPPs. 
In France, for example, the Millau viaduct, a major motorway bridge, has been refinanced with an index-
linked €573 million loan by Eiffage, the concessionaire that has a 78-year deal to operate and maintain the 
viaduct.49 
 
The use of index-linked bonds supports the view that the financing structure of the English water companies 
is returning to a model closer to that of public ownership. A higher percentage is being financed by debt; a 
higher percentage of this is long-term debt; and it is based on a secure regulatory/government guarantee that 
revenue will always maintain a link to inflation.  And the remaining equity shares are also attractive to 
investors because they are similar to index-linked bonds, as noted in the FT: ―The enormous growth of 
infrastructure funds is based on demand from long-term institutional investors, pension funds in particular. 
At best, infrastructure assets ought to be a proxy for index-linked government bonds - long-dated, low-risk 
and inflation-proofed.‖ 50 
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5. Private equity and employment – the WEF/Harvard study 
5.1. Introduction 
The World Economic Forum meeting at Davis has published a large new study on private equity (PE):  
- The Globalization of Alternative Investments Working Papers Volume 1: The Global Economic 
Impact of Private Equity Report 2008.   http://www.weforum.org/pdf/cgi/pe/Full_Report.pdf .          
- The executive summary is available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/cgi/pe/Executive_Summary.pdf  
- The WEF issued a press release on 25 January 2008, available at 
http://www.weforum.org/en/media/Latest%20Press%20Releases/PrivateEquity_PressRelease  
 
The study was led by Josh Lerner, Jacob H. Schiff Professor of Investment Banking at Harvard Business 
School. It included four separate studies, covering the ‗demography‘ of PE, investment in innovation, impact 
on employment, and corporate governance. It also includes 6 case studies, two each from Europe, China, and 
India. This note is concerned only with the section ―Private Equity and Employment‖. 51 
5.2.  Results: workplaces lose 10% of jobs in 5 years following PE takeover 
The Harvard/WEF study shows that: 
- workplaces of firms taken over by PE have 10% less employees 5 years after the takeover, than if 
they had developed like similar workplaces not bought by PE: “the net impact on existing 
establishments is negative and substantial” (p.54) 
- firms taken over by PE have 3.6%-4.5% less employees 2 years after the takeover, than if they had 
developed like similar workplaces not bought by PE (even after including the net effect of creating, 
buying, closing and selling new workplaces): ―for a sample of surviving firms, we observe …..a 
negative net impact on employment that is substantial but smaller than that from the establishment-
level results that ignore greenfield entry.‖ (p.54) 
- firms taken over by PE have much higher rates of  closure, opening, acquisition and disposal of 
workplaces, in the 2 years following a PE takeover, than comparable firms: ―we observe more 
greenfield entry, more acquisitions, divestitures and establishment shut-downs‖ (p.54) 
 
The reporting of these results has been confused by misleading ‗spin‘ about the impact of ‗greenfield‘ 
employment changes and the comparative bankruptcy rate.  
 
5.3. Background: study designed in response to union critiques 
The design of the employment study was influenced by the critiques published by trade unions. The 
introduction to the employment section refers to the limitations of studies by the various private equity 
associations, listed as: 
 
- Reliance on surveys with incomplete response 
- Inability to control for employment changes in comparable firms 
- Failure to distinguish cleanly between employment changes at firms backed by venture capital and 
firms backed by other forms of private equity 
- Difficulties in disentangling organic job growth from acquisitions, divestitures and reorganizations 
- Inability to determine where jobs are being created and destroyed 
 
A footnote references only the two reports published by the SEIU and Unite/TGWU are the sources for these 
points: ―See Service Employees International Union (2007) and Hall (2007) for detailed critiques.‖ 52   
 
The report then states that ―In this study, we construct and analyse a dataset that overcomes these limitations 
and, at the same time, encompasses a much larger set of employers and private equity transactions.‖53 
 
5.4. Methodology 
The study is based on used the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) at the US Bureau of the Census, 
which covers all non-farm private companies, to follow employment at PE-backed companies in the US 
between 1980 and 2005, before and after PE takeover.  The study looked at employment changes in actual 
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workplaces owned by these firms – factories, offices etc – as well as employment changes resulting from 
new establishments, the closure of existing establishments, and further takeovers or disposals by the firms. It 
identified about 5,000 PE-backed firms, covering 300,000 US establishments, and also a control group of 1.4 
million other establishments and firms, selected for being of comparable industry, age, and size to the PE-
backed establishments and firms at the time of their takeover. The study looked at employment changes for 5 
years before and after the PE takeover. 
 
This approach does not suffer from the methodological problems of the private equity association surveys. It 
provides data on changes in employment in actual workplaces, and, separately, employment changes in the 
firm as a whole, including the effects of acquisitions and disposals. It excludes venture capital companies 
and management buyouts where private equity was not involved. It covers all private equity buyouts in the 
USA since 1980, not a selected sample. It provides a set of ‗control‘ firms with similar characteristics for 
meaningful comparisons. The main limitation is that it covers only the USA. 
5.5. Overall results: cumulative job losses of 10% 
The main results are based on studies of employment changes at establishment (workplace level).  This data 
reflects what happens to employees in existing workplaces taken over by a PE fund. It does not include 
changes due to new workplaces being created, or bought. The data shows that employment shrinks more 
rapidly in establishments after a PE takeover, than in control establishments. The study found that the actual 
change in employment in the establishments subject to PE takeovers was about 7% worse after 3 years, and 
10.3% worse after 5 years, than it would have been without the takeovers.  
 
Table 12.  Cumulative difference in employment in workplaces after private equity takeovers 
(percentage of total employment at year of takeover, compared with similar firms not subject to PE)  
 After 2 years After 5 years 
% change -7% -10.3% 
Total („000s)  -340,000 
 
The report states: 
―Figure 6C compares the actual employment level of private equity transactions pre- and post-
transaction with the implied employment of these targets had they grown at the same rate as the 
controls. This exercise permits evaluating the cumulative impact of the differences in net growth 
rates between targets and controls. To conduct this counterfactual exercise, the employment level of 
the controls is normalized to be exactly equal to that of the targets in the transaction year. The 
pattern for the controls shows the counterfactual level of employment that would have emerged for 
targets if the targets had exhibited the same pre- and post-transaction employment growth rates as 
the controls. Figure 6C shows that, five years after the transaction, the targets have a level of 
employment that is 10.3% lower than it would be if targets had exhibited the same growth rates as 
controls.‖ (p.50) 
 
5.6. Net job losses at firm level 2 years after PE takeover 
A separate analysis of the firms takes account of the opening of new workplaces (‗greenfield‘), the closure of 
existing workplaces, and the buying and selling of subsidiaries, as well as the effect on existing workplaces. 
The report finds that the net result of all this is negative: -3.6% of total employment after 2 years compared 
with control group.  The table shows the details of this data. All elements of the effects were negative: the 
creation and exit of workplaces is negative; the net result of acquisitions and disposal is negative; and these 
add to a negative effect on employment in surviving workplaces. 54 
 
Table 13.  Employment changes in firms 2 years after private equity takeovers 
(percentage of total employment at year of takeover, compared with similar firms not subject to PE)  
 PE firms Control group Difference 
   (PE effect) 
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Greenfield entry rate +14.9 +9.0 +5.9 
Establishment exit rate -16.7 -8.1 -8.6 
Net effect of workplace creation and 
closures 
-1.8 +0.9 -2.7 
    
Establishment acquisition rate 7.4 +4.7 +2.7 
Establishment divestiture rate -5.8 -2.9 -2.9 
Net effect of acquisitions and disposals +1.6 +1.8 -0.2 
    
Continuing establishment net growth rate -1.7 -0.1 -1.6 
    
Overall two-year growth rate -1.9 2.6 -4.5 
 
5.7. Other points 
5.7.1. Insecurity 
As the report points out, the rate of acquisitions, sales, new plants and closures are all about twice as high in 
PE firms as in others.  The report describes this process as ‗creative destruction‘, but the other side of this is 
much greater insecurity for workers. In 2 years following a PE takeover, 24% of employees will have 
experienced  their workplace being closed, sold, or reduced – double the uncertainty compared with a firm 
which has not been the subject of a PE takeover.   
 
5.7.2. Total jobs lost as a result of private equity takeovers in the USA  
Since the study was effectively looking at all the PE takeovers in the USA since 1980, and the employment 
effects are probably largely complete after 5 years, the difference represents an assessment of the overall 
actual effect of private equity on jobs in the USA.  This implies that the loss is around 340,000 jobs.55   
 
 
5.7.3.  Sectoral differences 
The study found significant differences in the impact between sectors. The cumulative effect after 5 years 
was lowest in manufacturing (-2.4%), around 10% in retail and services, and highest of all in finance, where 
the report only states that the effect is ‗very large‘.  
Table 14.  Employment falls linked to private equity takeovers, by sector 
(percentage of total employment at year of takeover, compared with similar firms not subject to PE)  
SECTOR Impact on employment 5 
years after PE takeover (%) 
Manufacturing -2.4% 
Retail -9.6% 
Services -9.7% 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate “very large” 
ALL SECTORS -10.3% 
Source: Harvard/WEF 2008, pp. 50-51, footnotes 17 and 19 
 
5.7.4. Greenfield gains do not offset other job losses 
It is very clear from the figures in table 2 that the greater increase in PE firms of ‗greenfield‘ employment 
does not offset the other sources of job loss at existing establishments. It does not even offset the greater job 
loss from workplace closures.  
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5.7.5. Bankruptcy: more likely for PE firms 
Some media coverage suggests that the report finds that job losses are offset by the fact that PE-backed 
companies have a lower bankruptcy rate, and so fewer jobs are lost through bankruptcies: e.g. the BBC 
report claims that ―private equity-controlled firms are less likely to go bankrupt.‖   
 
This is untrue. It is not only untrue, it is the opposite of what the report found. The employment study itself 
has no specific observations on bankruptcies, but the first section of the report (―The new demography of 
private equity‖) did produce evidence on this issue.  It found that PE firms are twice as likely to go 
bankrupt as the average publicly owned company: 
 
―For our total sample, 6% of deals have ended in bankruptcy or reorganization and the frequency of 
financial distress seems to have gone down over time. Excluding the LBOs occurring after 2002, 
which may not have had enough time to enter financial distress, the average rate is 7%. Assuming an 
average holding period of six years, this works out to an annual default rate of 1.2% per year. The 
annual default rate for US publicly traded firms in Compustat over the 1983 to 2002 period was half 
this number, 0.6%...‖ (p.8) 
 
The study even notes that the real figure of PE bankruptcies may well be significantly higher than this: 
―……One caveat is that not all distress cases may be recorded in publicly available data sources and 
some of these cases may be ―hidden‖ in the relatively large fraction of ―unknown‖ exits (11%).‖ 
(p.9) 
 
The report even found that PE-backed buyouts were more likely to go bankrupt than other kinds of leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs):  
―….. Although LBOs sponsored by private equity funds are more likely to experience a successful 
exit, they are also somewhat more likely to have their investments end up in financial distress, 
controlling for other factors.‖ (p.5) 
 
And that the rate of bankruptcy of LBOs was highest of all in the UK and USA: 
―Finally, possibly because Capital IQ coverage of corporate failures may be more accurate in the US 
and the UK, LBOs undertaken in these regions are more likely to end up in bankruptcy and the 
magnitudes are very large (five and seven percentage points, respectively).‖ (p.10) 
 
The report does note that the annual bankruptcy rate of 1.2% is lower than that of corporate bonds: 
―Even though the LBO default rates are indeed higher than that of Compustat firms, they are lower 
than the average default rates of corporate bond issuers 1980–2002, which was 1.6% according to 
Moody‘s.‖ (p.9)  
 This may be relevant for investors considering PE or corporate bonds as alternative investments, but it has 
no implications for employment: as the designers of the employment study would point out, the group of 
companies which issue corporate bonds is not in any way matched or comparable to the companies bought 
by PE-firms.  The employment study itself has no conclusion about relative bankruptcy rates.  
 
5.7.6. Common pattern of rise and fall, not just PE 
The patterns of employment growth and decline are similar for both the PE workplaces and the comparators, 
as shown in the graph. The report correctly points out that this shows the importance of having a matched 
sample, to avoid the false conclusion that the pattern is special to PE. It also points out that the broad pattern 
is typical of all employment data (―if one randomly observes establishments at some fixed point in their 
lifecycle, they will, on average, exhibit growth up to the point and will, on average, exhibit decline from that 
point on‖ – footnote 15).  So the decline by itself shows nothing about the effect of PE. It is the gap between 
the two lines at the end, after 5 years, which shows the impact of PE. 
 
Chart B. Employment patterns in PE and comparable workplaces before and after takeover  
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5.8. Misleading spin, inadequate press reports  
The press release of the WEF is extremely, presumably deliberately, confusing about these results.  
- It states that ―Employment has a "J-curve" pattern in the years pre-and-post buyout‖ , although the 
study at no point refers to a J-curve, nor do any of its results resemble a J-curve 
- It fails to mention that the study shows that employment is 10% lower 5 years after a PE-takeover 
- It mentions that ―Firms backed by private equity have 6% more greenfield job creation than the 
control group two years after the buyout.‖, but fails to mention that  PE firms have 8.6% greater job 
destruction from closing sites, so the net effect is in fact the same as the general trend. 
 
The WEF summary of the panel discussion at Davos also credits Josh Lerner with an untrue account of the 
results of his own paper: ―a review of 5,000 acquired companies found the number of jobs created at new 
factories or offices quickly offset job losses at old facilities‖ 56 – whereas the study in fact shows that after 
taking into account all the acquisitions and greenfields etc, firms bought by PE have 3.6% - 4.5% less 
employment after just 2 years, compared with other similar firms. 
The Private Equity Council (PEC) encouraged the confusion by issuing a press release containing two untrue 
statements: ―The studies demonstrate that PE firms are job savers and job growers. Firms acquired by PE on 
average are losing jobs at a faster clip than their peers when purchased - but over time, as the business is 
stabilized and refocused by PE investors, the employment trend rises to match the industry average at old 
facilities and exceeds average industry-wide job creation at new facilities.‖ 57 
This disinformation was very successful. The main media reports have suggested that the report has mixed 
results on the employment impact, or even that it shows job loss to be a myth. The BBC‘s report  for 
example is captioned ―Companies bought by private equity firms do not destroy jobs on a large scale, a study 
suggests‖, and includes the incorrect statement that ―private equity-controlled firms are less likely to go 
bankrupt.‖ 58 A report by Andrew Sorkin in the Herald Tribune managed to assert that ―Companies owned by 
private equity shed, on average, about one percentage point more jobs than their peers.‖59. Three days later, 
the same journalist wrote a different report for the New York Times, but this time dismissed the report as ―so 
muddied that it was difficult to make sense of it‖, and instead preferred to quote another unsubstantiated 
claim by the PEC that PE funds created 8.4% more jobs than others 60 .  
The FT report by Martin Arnold came closest to accuracy, headlined ‗Fewer jobs created at private equity 
acquisitions‘ , and, correctly reporting that ‗Buy-out deals failed more often than other companies, the report 
found, with 6 per cent ending in bankruptcy or financial restructuring‘.61 
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5.9. Conclusion 
The report is the soundest and most comprehensive study of the employment effects of PE 
It shows beyond doubt that the employment impact of PE takeovers is negative.  
It supports both the assertions and the critiques published by the unions. 
It contains further interesting data on PE effects, e.g. the doubling of uncertainty of employment. 
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